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Employment Division v. Smi th  and 
the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism 
Ira C. LUPU* 
When the organizers of this Symposium asked me to 
discuss the future of the free exercise of religion, I thought I 
might address several subjects: Employment Division v. 
Smith,' and its treatment by the lower courts and legal 
scholars; important new developments in state constitutional 
law affecting religious liberty; the Church of the Lukumi2 case, 
then pending before the U.S. Supreme Court; and the status of 
the proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).3 
Once my turn to address the Symposium actually arose, 
however, a number of speakers had addressed Smith and its 
consequences, Professor Carmella had thoroughly assessed the 
state law developments,4 and Professor Laycock-who argued 
the Church of the Lukumi case in the Supreme Court and has 
participated extensively in the legislative effort to enact 
RFFU-gobbled up much of what was left over. 
Left with the crumbs, I faced an  academic's mini-crisis: I 
could either remain mute or run the risk of boring the 
* Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, National Law Center, The 
George Washington University. This paper is based (somewhat loosely) upon 
remarks made at a Symposium on New Directions in Religious Liberty, held a t  
Brigham Young University on January 22-23, 1993. My thanks to Professors Fred 
Gedicks and Cole Durham, and to the Brigham Young University Law Review, for 
the invitation to participate in the Symposium and the splendid arrangements they 
made for it. 
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
2. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 
(1993). 
3. S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1308, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993). The House passed H.R. 1308 on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG. REC. H2356-63 
(daily ed. May 11, 1993), and S. 578 was approved by the Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of 15 to 1, 139 CONG. REC. D472 (daily ed. May 
6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 1993, at A9. 
4. Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An 
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y .U. L. REV. 275. 
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(Saturday a.m.) audience by repeating much of what had been 
thoroughly dmussed over the previous two days. Believing that 
originality and creativity may sometimes result from precisely 
this sort of s q ~ e e z e , ~  I nevertheless ventured onward in my 
remarks. What follows is reasonably true to the address I 
delivered, which was in lieu of the thoughts that centrally 
occupied my mind that day-to wit, the beauty of Utah and the 
special qualities of its Mormon6 community. 
I. THE CONSEQUENCES AND FUTURE OF Smith 
Like many others, I believe that Employment Division v. 
Smith is substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible. 
For example, Justice Scalia, the author of Smith, claims to be 
an  originalist.' Smith shows no signs, however, of any such 
orientation; the Court's opinion totally ignores both the text 
and history of the Free Exercise Clause. In addition, Smith 
offends institutional and process norms as well. Relying on 
overruled or doctrinally discredited decisions of the Supreme 
Court, as did the Smith majority: is ordinarily frowned upon 
in  legal circles, as is the practice of deciding major 
constitutional questions without giving the parties an 
opportunity to brief and argue them. Understandably, then, 
criticism of Smith on those grounds has become cornmonpla~e.~ 
5. At least it works that way in science, in which, unlike the law, professional 
norms operate strongly against doing no more than repeating what is already 
known. 
6. "Mormon" is a term used to refer to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- 
day Saints. 
7. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 
(1989). 
8. The Smith opinion cites approvingly Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. 586 (1940), without mentioning that it was overruled three years later by 
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943). 494 U.S. at  
872. A lawyer who did this in a brief to any court could expect to be publicly 
chastised for it. The Smith opinion also cites with approval the belief-action 
distinction originally created in free exercise law by Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145 (1978), without fairly describing the extent to which the Reynolds 
approach had been discredited and rejected in the twentieth century. 494 U.S. at  
872. 
9. For criticism of Smith, see James D. Gordon 111, Free Exercise on the 
Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free 
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism 
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., 
Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 
(1991). Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Church of the Lukumi echoed many 
of these scholars' criticisms. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
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What is less obvious and perhaps more intriguing, 
however, is why Smith matters. If, as has been repeatedly 
argued, free exercise law on the decision's eve was already 
quite hostile to religious liberty,'' what explains the powerful 
reaction? 
A. Cognition and Coase 
Smith's sweeping terms plowed through the cognitive dis- 
sonance that had become pervasive among followers of free 
exercise trends. Before Smith, a long line of Supreme Court 
decisions rejecting free exercise claims could each be satisfacto- 
rily explained to most Americans by simply referencing the ap- 
propriate buzz words-an Indians case," a military case," a 
Muslims-in-prison case,13 a tax-system-integrity case,'* and 
several cases concerning churches that many suspected had a 
fraudulent air about them.15 The average American could 
learn of all these cases and still believe that the Free Exercise 
Clause would protect him or her, even if it did not protect oth- 
ers? This sort of thinking is always good for tyranny and bad 
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240 (Souter, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise 
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (defending Smith's outcome, but not the 
opinion itself); see also Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious 
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (arguing 
that constitutional history does not support the concept of exemptions); William P. 
Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to 
Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLV 591 (1990). 
10. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 743, 756-57 (1992). 
11. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 US. 439 (1988); 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
12. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
13. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
14. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
15. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); 
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. 
Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
16. Cf, NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE (1992). In- 
deed, Smith itself had some of this character-did we really expect that the Su- 
preme Court was going to legitimate the use of hallucinogenic drugs under the 
Constitution? Justice O'Connor did not disappoint us in this regard. Just as she 
indicated that the state should not endorse religion but blinded herself to such 
endorsement in Lynch v. D o ~ e l l y ,  465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con- 
curring), she purports to believe in a robust religious liberty but nevertheless is 
prepared to deny it to those who practice the rituals of the Native American 
Church. Smith, 494 US. at 902-03, 906 (O'Co~or, J., concurring). As former Attor- 
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for liberty. By ending the stream of decisions designed to ap- 
pear as special exceptions-that is, by emphasizing a new gen- 
eral principle rather than focusing on the facts of the 
case-smith raised consciousness of what had been occurring 
in the field. 
Second, while the Reagan and Bush Administrations had 
been pushing a philosophy of judicial restraint for the previous 
decade, they may have been internally divided as to where that 
philosophy would take them with regard to free exercise. It 
may have been easy for some conservatives to think that the 
Bill of Rights is divisible; that is, that the Court in the 1980s 
would cut back on perceived excesses of its predecessors on 
questions of privacy, criminal procedure, freedom of expression, 
or nonestablishment, but that it would not similarly undermine 
prevailing law on the Free Exercise Clause. That hope, of 
course, was sheer fantasy; statism tends to swallow the entire 
Bill of Rights, rather than the particular provisions those in po- 
litical power do not favor. 
Third, if one focuses on the dynamics of litigation and 
settlement, the argument that Smith only clarified, rather than 
altered, the law is vastly overstated. Prior to Smith, prospec- 
tive and actual litigants on both sides of free exercise questions 
had to consider the distinct possibility that a free exercise 
claim would successfully exempt a particular group or practice 
from an  otherwise generally applicable law. Indeed, although 
the Supreme Court grew increasingly inhospitable to free exer- 
cise claims over time, such attacks occasionally prevailed in the 
lower courts, state1? and federal.'' Appraising the probability 
of success in light of these emerging developments presumably 
affected both a litigator's decision whether or not to bring suit 
in  a particular circumstance, and his or her decision as to the 
terms and appropriateness of compro~nise.'~ Pre-Smith free 
exercise law inevitably cast a sigdicant shadow over the bar- 
gains struck by parties to religious liberty disputes. 
Smith has altered that shadow. The lower courts have 
ney General John Mitchell once aptly put it, 'Watch what we do, not what we 
say." See David Broder, FBI Building Named for Hoover Can Be a Reminder, Not 
a Tribute, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1993, at 23. 
17. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964). 
18. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 
(5th Cir. Unit A July 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1981). 
19. These estimates may also have affected legislative bargaining over whether 
to create a religious exemption, although that is less likely. 
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ignored the Supreme Court's emphasis upon criminal laws of 
general applicability, and they have been quite willing to ex- 
tend the reasoning of Smith to the fullest extent po~sible.'~ 
We all understand that Smith transfers power away from reli- 
gion and toward the state; the angry reaction at the Sympo- 
sium to Mark Tushnet's suggestion that state-church conflicts 
may help religious communities "clarifly] [their] commit- 
m e n t ~ " ~ ~  was simply a local manifestation of that awareness. 
As the Mormon experience amply demonstrates? clarification 
of this sort tends to be little more than a process of change 
coerced by state oppression or insensitivity. 
Of course, those versed in law and economics might say I'm 
making too much of the argument that  pre-Smith law influ- 
enced free exercise litigation strategies and settlements, partly 
because the free exercise entitlement was relatively weak be- 
fore Smith, and partly because their general view is that the 
initial assignment of entitlements frequently does not matter. 
In the hypothetical world described by the Coase T h e ~ r e m ? ~  
in which zero transaction costs are assumed, the parties are ex- 
pected to bargain to an efficient result, regardless of the law's 
allocation of rights. 
With regard to disputes over religion, however, this as- 
sumption is highly implausible. However irrational the chal- 
lenged religious commitments may seem, communities of be- 
lievers are deeply invested in them. The idea that such commit- 
ments can be bargained away without incuning substantial 
transaction costs, measured by the religious community's will- 
ingness to allocate resources in resistance to the state's en- 
croachments upon its religious belief and practice, is absurd. 
When people believe that God has commanded some practice, 
and institutions have crystallized around that belief, fidelity to 
20. For decisions reading Smith broadly and extending it to  civil matters, see 
Ryan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992); American Friends Sew. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 
F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991); Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 
(6th Cir. 1991); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 786 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D. Ohio 
1992); In re Chinske, 785 F. Supp. 130 (D. Mont. 1991); New Life Gospel Church 
v. Department of Community Affairs, 608 A.2d 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1992). 
21. Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
117, 132. 
22. See, e.g., Frederick M. Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Re- 
sponse to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167 (1992). 
23. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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i t  cannot be negotiated away without costly convulsions.24 
Under these conditions, it will be very difficult for disput- 
ing parties t o  find common ground for compromise. One would 
therefore expect the substantive content of the law, rather than 
the parties' mutual understanding of their respective interests, 
to be the primary variable in the way disputes are settled. I 
suspect that the change in free exercise law that Smith repre- 
sents will have a dramatic affect on the range of suits brought 
and settlements reached, as well as on the results of actual 
litigation, all to the detriment of religious liberty. 
B. The Importance of Church of the Lukumi 
in the Future of Free Exercise: 
Moderating the Effects of Smith 
Perhaps the pessimism of this analysis can be escaped by 
focusing upon what Smith leaves open, rather than upon the 
damage it may already have done. At the Symposium, Profes- 
sor Laycock contended that the Church of the Lukumi casez5 
presented little opportunity for substantive gains for free exer- 
~ i s e . ' ~  At best, he said, a disaster for religious liberty might be 
avoided if the Justices accept his argument that the City of 
Hialeah engaged in an unconstitutional religious gerrymander 
when it enacted various ordinances prohibiting certain forms of 
ritual ~laughter.~' 
With all respect to Professor Laycock's modesty in refusing 
24. Asymmetry of information between state and church officials is likely to 
further undermine any prediction that the parties will be indifferent to the choice 
of liability rule. As economists have argued, the presence of private information 
will skew the outcome of bargains. See, e.g., Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. 
Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 
(1983). This has been measured in the context of the settlement of litigation, al- 
though the variables of interest to parties must be specified and quantified for the 
measurements to be reliable in economic terms. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation 
and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984). Infor- 
mation asymmetry is of course endemic to church-state conflicts involving religious 
beliefs. Although the religious community may understand the state's policy con- 
cerns, state authorities are likely to be woefully ignorant and uneducable concern- 
ing the history and theological significance of a religious community's commitments. 
The recent tragedy at Waco, Texas involving the Branch Davidians' standoff with 
the FBI .seems a good example of this sort of unbridgeable misunderstanding. 
25. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 
(1993). 
26. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 221, 255. 
27. Id. 
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to proclaim the possibility of an important victory, I believe 
Church of the Lukumi proved to  be much more significant than 
he suggested. First and foremost, the Court unanimously 
agreed that this was a religious gerrymander, and that such 
acts are presumptively ~nconstitutional.~~ By holding that the 
Constitution prohibits religious gerrymanders structured to the 
detriment of a particular faith, the Court has reaffirmed 
Larson v. Valente2' and constructed an outer boundary beyond 
which the deterioration of free exercise protection will not pass. 
Although the Court's opinion is entirely true to the equal pro- 
tection character of Smith, the right of religious minorities to 
be free from state discrimination, both overt and covert, is of 
both theoretical and practical significance. Furthermore, any 
constitutional victory for an unusual, numerically small reli- 
gion constitutes a significant sign that the Free Exercise 
Clause still carries some punch. 
Second, Church of the Lukumi provides important informa- 
tion about the views of Justices Souter and Thomas, each of 
whom replaced a dissenting Justice in Smith. The Court opin- 
ion in Church of the Lukumi expressly reaffirmed Smith's un- 
derlying principle of formal free exercise neutrality.30 Justice 
Thomas joined in this portion of the opinion, thus indicating 
his agreement with the basic principle in Smith. By sharp 
contrast, Justice Souter (fast becoming the darling of the law 
professors) wrote a concurring opinion arguing that Smith may 
have been wrongly decided and should be reexa~nined.~' Thus, 
28. Church of the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-31. 
29. 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding that the state may not legislate reporting 
requirements for religious fund raising that are designed to regulate "street reli- 
gion" like the Unification Church while exempting mainstream religion). For an 
Establishment Clause variation on the anti-gerrymander theme, see Grumet v. 
Board of Education, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (school district gerry- 
mander designed to benefit religious community that will not send its children out 
of the community for special educational services violates the Establishment 
Clause). 
30. "In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our 
cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general 
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the 
law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Church of 
the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at  2226. The Court spoke dishonestly, I believe, when it 
claimed that its "cases" establish this general proposition; only Smith, which is the 
only decision the Court cited, stands for this'proposition, and Smith is in tension 
with all the other free exercise decisions of the past thirty years. Justice Souter's 
concurring opinion in Church of the Lukumi made this point forcefully. 113 S. Ct. 
at  2240 (Souter, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). 
31. Id. 
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the two against Smith (Justices Brerman and Marshall) have 
become Thomas for and Souter against, and the latter brings 
obvious fervor to the enterprise. The Smith lineup also reveals 
that  the Court is now divided 6-3 in favor of retaining Smith, 
with one of the six (Justice White) about to be replaced by a 
nominee whose views on free exercise may be more sympathet- 
ic than those of her predece~sor?~ 
Third, Church of the Lukumi reveals Justice Kennedy 
f m l y  committed to his vote in Smith. Among the Smith ma- 
jority, he alone had shown an  inclination to depart from ten- 
dencies reflected in his earlier Religion Clause opinions.33 Be- 
cause the Hialeah ordinances were so obviously gerrymandered 
against the practitioners of Santeria, however, Justice Kennedy 
might have ruled for the Church while remaining silent on his 
more general views of free exercise exemptions from facially 
neutral, generally applicable laws. That he did not do so sug- 
gests he was determined to reassure his conservative col- 
leagues that he would not abandon them here as he had on 
abortion and graduation prayer? 
C. The "Hybrid Rights" Claim: Smith's Open Door 
Nothing in Church of the Lukumi expands, narrows, or 
clarifies Smith's pronouncement concerning so-called hybrid 
right claims. These claims are based upon the conjunction of 
free exercise and other constitutionally significant rights, like 
free speech or parental control over the rearing of children. 
Whatever the theoretical explanation for greater receptivity to 
"free exercise plus" than "free exercise pure," a great many free 
exercise claims might be recast to take advantage of this con- 
struct. Although I doubt that Smith itself might be so 
tran~formed:~ free exercise claims frequently involve expres- 
32. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 739 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc of a panel 
opinion rejecting the claim of an Orthodox Jew to be exempt from an Air Force 
regulation outlawing the wearing of headgear while indoors), affd, 475 U.S. 503 
(1986). 
33. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) with County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., dissenting). 
34. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Lee v. Weisman, 
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
35. The peyote experience is apparently an inward one, and therefore does not 
involve the sort of communication that might qualify it as expression for constitu- 
tional purposes. See, e.g., CARLOS CASTANEDA, THE TEACHINGS OF DON JUAN: A 
YAQUI WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (1968). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: 
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sion, association, or parental concern for the religious upbring- 
ing of their children. The last of these, of course, is the most 
important; it is the foundation of Wisconsin u. Yoder,36 and be- 
cause it depends upon the judge-made right of parental control 
as a boost to the textual right of free exercise, i t  is the most 
controversial member of the hybrid rights set.37 In addition, a 
great many free exercise claims involve the parent-child-state 
triangle,s8 so Yoder's fate is of crucial signifkance to the de- 
velopment of the law in the field. 
Creative lawyering might thus preserve the force of many 
potential claims. At the very least, pressing hybrid claims 
wherever plausible will presumably result in either an explana- 
tion and reaffirmation of "free exercise plus," or an ultimate 
admission by the Court that the theory was no more than a n  
unprincipled attempt to pretend that Yoder survived Smith. 
D. The Changing Court and the Future of Smith 
Of course, as Justice White's resignationsg brought home, 
the Justices that decided Smith will not be around forever. We 
have a new President from a political party associated with a t  
least some degree of commitment to the Bill of Rights and 
judicial enforcement of it. President Clinton is likely to have 
the opportunity to name several Justices, and a Court so recon- 
stituted may ultimately reverse the course charted by Smith. 
When nominating future Justices, however, President Clinton 
is unlikely to put a high priority on Religion Clause consider- 
ations in general, or Free Exercise Clause concerns in particu- 
lar. The most a foe of Smith might hope for is a new Justice 
who takes the Bill of Rights seriously and believes in some ver- 
sion of the Warren Court's commitment to strenuous enforce- 
ment of those rights.40 
Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 773- 
78 (1986) (contrasting the elements and contours of free exercise claims and those 
of free speech claims). Whether the peyote ritual, or the animal sacrifice rituals of 
Santeria, contain sufficient components of association to qualify either under the 
hybrid right theory may present closer questions. 
36. 406 US. 205 (1972). 
37. Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and 
Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 87. 
38. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 US. 1066 (1988); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 
(Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989). 
39. Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He'll Step Down from High Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar 20, 1993, at 1. 
40. See supra note 32 for a fragment of evidence concerning Judge Ginsburg's 
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If this were to happen, we would be reminded that the set 
of constitutional rights we enjoy are ultimately indivisible. I t  is 
very mcult to sustain the position that the Free Exercise 
Clause should be actively enforced by courts, but that the 
Speech Clause, the Press Clause, and the criminal procedure 
provisions in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments should 
not. Nor can one legitimately advocate free exercise activism 
while a t  the same time arguing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantees of equality, procedural fairness, and 
(as construed) privacy should not be similarly enfor~ed.~' 
Ultimately, this is a roundabout way of asserting that the 
Free Exercise Clause may be reinvigorated only if Justices with 
constitutional philosophies akin to those of Thurgood Marshall 
or William Brennan are appointed. Of course, not everyone who 
is unhappy with Smith would be prepared to accept a Warren 
Court civil libertarian-type in exchange for Smith's overruling. 
When contemporary egalitarian concerns are added to this 
stew-that is, the possibility that a Marshall-Brennan type will 
be prepared to uphold restrictions upon religious freedom en- 
acted in the name of nondi~crimination~~-Smith might turn 
out to be something many of its opponents will decide they can 
live with after all. 
11. THE MOVE AWAY FROM THE SUPREME COURT 
Whatever the future course of free exercise adjudication in 
the Supreme Court, Smith has already resulted in a flood of 
activity with the potential to alter the course of religious liber- 
ty in American law. The energies flowing in Smith's wake are 
academic, judicial, and political. As is evidenced by this Sympo- 
sium, legal scholars have turned substantial attention to the 
views on free exercise. 
41. The story becomes still more complex when one recalls that the Establish- 
ment Clause can be a serious limit on the political branches' capacity to accommo- 
date religion. Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 US. 1 (1989) with 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 US. 327 (1987). For scholarly 
debate on the subject, compare Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: 
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992) with 
Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Reli- 
gion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U.  P~IT. L. REV. 75 
(1990) and Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against 
the Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991). 
42. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 US. 574 (1983) (upholding deni- 
al of tax exemption to university with racially discriminatory policies); see also 
Tushnet, supra note 2 1, at  127. 
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problems and issues raised by Smith. As so well documented by 
Professor Carmella in her some state courts have 
begun to develop state constitutional law in response to the gap 
created by Smith. And, on the legislative front, the United 
States Congress continues to consider the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Actd4 and the very recently introduced amend- 
ments to the American Indian Religious Freedom I 
want to comment briefly on each of these phenomena, because I 
believe that in combination they may eventually lead to and 
sustain a deep and powerful structure of religious liberty law 
that is largely independent of the Supreme Court's view of the 
First Amendment's religion clauses. 
A. Academic Commentary 
With respect to the academic commentary, my point is 
simple. Criticizing Smith is no longer original or useful; we 
have all become repetitive in our criticisms, and by now, our 
audiences are either persuaded or turned off. What remains 
before us is the hard work of reconstruction, made more diffi- 
cult by the chaotic and unsatisfactory state of free exercise law 
as i t  stood on the eve of Smith. In other words, it will not do to 
complain about Smith without offering concrete and detailed 
proposals for how free exercise principles should be shaped in  
the future. If such efforts are fruitful, the "new" era of free 
exercise may turn out to be far more coherent and substantive- 
ly adequate than anything that has come before. 
B. State Law and Religious Liberty 
State courts may play a vital role in providing a solid foun- 
dation for future protection of religious liberty. Prior to Smith, 
state supreme courts-even those with a strong religious liber- 
ty clause in their respective state constitutions-were quite 
reluctant to tie their views of the subject to state law. Rather, 
43. Carmella, supm note 4, at  310. 
44. Senators Kennedy and Hatch recently introduced the proposed legislation in 
the 103rd Congress as S. 578, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. See 
S. 578, supra note 3; see also H.R. 1308, supra note 3. The House passed H.R. 
1308 on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG. REC. H2356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993), and S. 
578 was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of 
15 to 1, 139 CONG. REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress 
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1993, at  A9. 
45. S. 1021 Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act), 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 518, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
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pursuant to their own versions of "the devil made me do it," 
they tended to integrate state law with federal law and explic- 
itly follow the federal law wherever it led? 
The consequences of this refusal to articulate independent 
state constitutional law are serious. On the road to Smith, 
federal law became increasingly less protective of religious 
liberty. By ignoring the possibility of independent state law 
protection for religion, state courts became both dependent on 
the U.S. Supreme Court and vulnerable to the erosion of reli- 
gious liberty that resulted from the backsliding force of federal 
law. Because state courts failed to rely upon their state consti- 
tutions to fill the widening gap between federal law and an 
adequate conception of religious freedom:' state law initially 
provided no insulation against Smith's blistering effect on free 
exercise norms. 
Fortunately, as Professor Carmella illustrates, state courts 
have begun to rely upon state constitutions in an effort to res- 
urrect some aspects of religious liberty.4s In addition to the 
substantive advance this represents, such state court behavior 
advances process values as well. It permits the development of 
constitutional norms of religious freedom without the brooding 
omnipresence of a single, authoritative national tribunal or the 
lesser (but significant) presence of a single set of national rules 
and standards. If and when Smith is overturned by the Su- 
preme Court, federal law may have a number of well-developed 
judicial models, tested in the crucible of real adjudicative sys- 
tems, from which to borrow and learn. 
C. The Proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Whether Congress will act to overturn Smith by enacting 
some form of the Religion Freedom Restoration Act4' (RFRA) 
46. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (Free Exercise Clause 
protects Native American Church member against criminal prosecution for ritual 
use of peyote); accord, State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973), 
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974). See generally Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on 
State Constitutions-Away fiom a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 
(1981); Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 
U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). 
47. See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic 
Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constztutiona2 Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 
(1985). 
48. Carmella, supra note 4, at  310. 
49. See S. 578, supra note 3; H.R. 1308, supra note 3. The most prominent 
prior version of the proposed Act was H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The 
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remains an open question as of this writing. For the past few 
years, the legislation was bogged down in partisan bickering 
over the abortion question-that is, whether a statutory protec- 
tion of religious freedom might become a platform for abortion 
rights were Roe v. wadeso to be o v e r t ~ r n e d . ~ ~  The fear that 
RFRA might operate in this way always seemed to me to be 
grossly exaggerated. Bill Clinton's election to the presidency, 
when coupled with Planned Parenthood v. C a ~ e y ~ ~  and Justice 
White's retirement:3 may settle the Roe question for the fore- 
seeable hture.  Accordingly, as recent news reports suggest,54 
the ghost of abortion may stop hovering over R F W s  prospects. 
I have elsewhere analyzed extensively the constitutionality 
and likely construction of RFRA.~' Here, I wish to emphasize 
three additional points. 
First, the 1993 version of RFRA that has passed the House 
differs in one si@icant respect from the version I discussed in 
my earlier work. The 1993 version declares its purposes to 
include the restoration of "the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Federal court cases before . . . Smith."56 The predeces- 
sor provision which appeared in prior incarnations of RFRA 
recited a purpose of restoring the "compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Y~der ."~ '  Be- 
cause the "federal court cases" leading up to Smith had so 
bill (H.R. 1308) passed the House on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG. REC. H2356-63 
(daily ed. May 11, 1993), and it was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
on May 6, 1993 by a vote of 15 to 1, 139 CONG. RE. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 
1993); Adam Clymer, Congress Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 1993, at  A9. 
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
51. See Abortion May Split Backers, USA TODAY, April 17, 1991, a t  A2; Robert 
P, Hey, Religious Freedom Legislation Could Snag on Abortion Controversy, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONPTOR, July 1, 1991, at  8. 
52. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
53. See supra note 39. 
54. See Catholic Group Will Back Act on Religious Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
13, 1993, a t  B4 (reporting a compromise, pursuant to which legislative history but 
not the legislation would assert that the A d  was abortion-neutral); see also the 
recent statement by Senator Kennedy, introducing RFRA of 1993, and asserting 
that the U.S. Catholic Conference now supported the Bill. 139 CONG. REC. S2823 
(daily ed. March 11, 1993) (statement of Senator Kennedy). 
55. Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 52-66 (1993). 
56. H.R. 1308, supra note 3, $ 2(b)(1) (set out a t  139 CONG. RE. H2356 (daily 
ed. May 11, 1993)). 
57. H.R. 2797, supra note 49, § 2(b)(l) (set forth in the Statutory Appendix to 
Lupu, supra note 55, at  87). 
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eviscerated Sherbert and ~ o d e r : ~  this drafting change has the 
potential to dilute quite significantly the force of the Act. The 
change is most certainly in tension with the "finding," remain- 
ing in the 1993 version, that "the compelling interest test as  set 
forth in Sherbert . . . and . . . Yoder is a workable test for strik- 
ing sensible balances between religious liberty and competing 
governmental  interest^."^' At the very least, the revised pur- 
poses provision signals to the Supreme Court that the Congress 
will be receptive to a continuation of a free exercise standard 
that is nominally favorable but operationally hostile to reli- 
gious freedom?' RFRA, so construed, would do little good oth- 
er than generate political benefit for its sponsors. 
Second, and contrary to Professor Laycock's assertions,6l 
RFRA would not have equally protective consequences for all 
religions. In particular, its terms would tend to exclude an 
important set of religious liberty claims-those made by mem- 
bers of Native American Indian tribes seeking to protect sacred 
Indian sites from the potentially destructive effect of govern- 
ment land development. As currently drafted, RFFU protects 
religions from government inflicted 'b~rden[s]. ' '~~ In Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective ASS'TL,~~ however, the 
Supreme Court held that government construction on public 
lands cannot constitute a cognizable burden upon religion so as 
to trigger the protection of the Free Exercise Clause-even 
when that construction inflicts serious damage upon the Indian 
sacred sites located on those landd4 Unless Congress chooses 
a term other than "burden" to trigger the stringent protections 
of RFRA, or otherwise clearly articulates its intent to overturn 
L ~ n g , ~ ~  RF'RA's enactment will not, alter the Lyng result and 
58. Lupu, supra note 55, at 53-54. 
59. H.R. 1308, supra note 3, 8 2(a)(5). The predecessor version of RFRA had an 
identical provision. H.R. 2797, supra note 49, 8 2(a)(5) (set forth in Lupu, supra 
note 55, at 87). 
60. See id. at 65-66 (suggesting that the Supreme Court may in any event seek 
ways of construing RFRA which narrow the gap between Congress-made and 
Court-made law). 
61. Laycock, supra note 26, at 235. 
62. S. 578, supra note 3, 5 3(a)-3(b); H.R. 1308, supra note 3, 5 3(a)-303). 
63. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
64. I criticize Lyng's theory of claim cognizability in Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights 
Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 
933 (1989). 
65. The proposed amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 
42 U.S.C. 8 1996 (1988), would overturn the result in Smith by preempting all 
state law which inhibits use of peyote in religious rituals by Native Americans, 
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thus may leave an entire category of important religion-based 
claims outside the protection of federal law. 
Third, it would be unfortunate if enactment of RFRA oper- 
ated to stifle the promising state constitutional law develop- 
ments previously discussed.66 State courts should treat RFRA 
as  a foundation upon which state constitutional law can build. 
Indeed, if the Supreme Court cuts RFRA back in the course of 
statutory interpretati~n,~' a post-enactment return by state 
courts to the practice of dovetailing state law with federal law 
would have tragic consequences. 
'1n Smith's wake, the responsibility for creatively elaborat- 
ing norms of religious liberty rests substantially with law-shap- 
ing and law-making institutions other than the Supreme Court. 
The law that may serve this purpose will, for the most part, be 
the corpus juris outside of federal constitutional law.68 
As has always been the case, however, the future of free 
exercise may well rest more upon sociological than legal consid- 
erations. The law cannot create the atmosphere of religious 
tolerance and mutual respect upon which religious liberty ulti- 
mately depends. Recall Judge Learned Hand's general view of 
the extent to which judicial review can preserve liberty: 
[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no 
court can save . . . a society where that spirit flourishes, no 
court need save . . . [and] in a society which evades its respon- 
sibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spir- 
it, that spirit in the end will perish.69 
Employment Division v. Smith cannot destroy religious 
liberty in  a society that truly respects it; nor, by the same to- 
ken, can an overruling of Smith save that liberty in a society 
and would reverse the general approach taken in Lgng to  the problem of reconcil- 
ing government land use with Indian religion. See S. 1021, supra note 45, 8 606; 
H.R. 518, supra note 45, 5 606. 
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
67. See Lupu, supra note 55. 
68. Similar prescriptions might fairly be made of other areas of rights law, 
such as that concerning privacy or new frontiers of equality, in which the Supreme 
Court has retreated or called an end to growth. See Lupu, supra note 55, at  37-52 
(discussing the proposed Freedom of Choice Act as a response to Casey and other 
decisions involving reproductive rights). 
69. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, 
in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172, 181 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). 
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which does not. The future of free exercise rests with a citizen- 
ry committed to the enterprise. Given the dramatic differences 
among religions, the all-too-frequent nexus between religion 
and violence, the psychologically threatening character of any 
religion not one's own,70 and the history of religious intoler- 
ance in our ~ount ry ,~ '  it requires a triumph of hope over expe- 
rience to be confident that religious exercise will remain free in 
the third century of our Bill of Rights. To the extent law mat- 
ters on such questions, however, liberating our commitment to 
religious freedom from the imperialistic grip of the Supreme 
Court and federal constitutional law may be the course of ac- 
tion most likely to produce salutary results. 
70. See William P. Marshall, ?"he Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 
(1993). 
71. See generally Edward M .  GafTney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (1992). 
